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observation of instances of discourse? Aristotle begins the Rhetoric with the statement that previous attempts to accomplish that
conceptualization have all been merely partial; his remark about
the shoes at the end of Topics VIII is in the same direction.
While modem editors of individual texts or students of particular
movements tend to look at theory as distinct from practice,
others, like Kennedy and Wilbur S. Howell, decline to discuss
historical data without its deep immersion in context and circumstance. Each approach has its virtues and vices: clarity with a risk
of anachronism for the first, richness with a risk of obscurity for
the second. Roughly speaking, it is a modern continuation of the
Isocrates-Aristotie split which Cicero recognized at the age of
nineteen (De inventione II.ii.8).
If this observation is correct, the apparent obfuseation of definition in this book is not willful, nor is it of course a product of
ignorance. Rather, it is a deliberate choice of method, based on
an appreciation of a certain point of view. Whether the book's
apparent lack of deflnition for the term "rhetoric" (or "oratory"
for that matter) is a fault or a blessing, then, will depend on the
reader's own point of view.
No matter how any individual reader may respond to the issue
of definition versus context, all readers will recognize in this book
a splendid addition to rhetorical history. Whether one sees the
book as a Baconian mass of data for induction, or as an exposition already generalized, the book and its author have to be
applauded.
James J. Murphy
Department of Rhetoric
University of California, Davis

Communication Philosophy and the Technological Age. Michael
J. Hyde, Editor. Birmingham:University of Alabama Press, 1982,
Pp. 135. $12.75
Philosophy seems to have a hard time dealing with technology.
There is a scarcity of good philosophical material, at any rate, on
the relationship of man and machine, though this is by common
consent a topic of enormous interest and importance. The five
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essays in this collection, revised versions of papers delivered at a
1980 University of Alabama symposium, attempt to explain how
technology modifies communication, a concern that is surely central to a philosophy of communications or technology.
Though they are only loosely related to one another, these
essays share a number of conventional assumptions about people
and their tools. They argue that technology is something fundamentally and obviously apart from us, something that menaces us
by seducing us to become like it. Their authors also believe that
modern electronic technologies from mass broadcasting to computing have a significantly different and a potentially more pernicious impact on human communication than all technologies that
preceded them. It is possible to be critical of many current technological arrangements, indeed of technology as a category, and
not to share these assumptions. Unfortunately for the strength of
the arguments of many modern critics of technology, these assumptions are easily proven false, at least as presented here.
In his introduction, Michael Hyde, Professor of Communications at Northwestern University, calls for a non-partisan discussion of technology. He says we should allow it to speak to us on
its own terms, as though it had a voice other than our own, or
someone's own. Technology is always a human arrangement of
nature for the sake of some imagined useful purpose, that is, on
behalf of what are perceived to be the interests of some persons.
This is true even though technologies inevitably have consequences, and regularly very harsh ones, not anticipated in their
design.
By refusing to consider the human origin of technology as the
interested creation of particular persons, the authors of these
essays are hard pressed to make clear what is different and more
threatening about current communication technologies. There
has been an "intensification" of technology, according to Hyde,
but it is not clear what that term means. The notion of a vaguely
linear acceleration of history is not substantial enough to distinguish the different ways in which language, print, and electronic
media—to take not the only examples, but certainly the most
obvious—affect the character of human dialogue.
Because these are very short essays, it is possible to summarize
each one and to show how key examples used to support particular arguments fall into traps set by the assumption of autonomous
technology. Perhaps the best essay is by Edward Godwin Ballard,
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who conceptualizes man-machine interaction as a variety of dialectic. Since the only intrinsic end that can be specifled for dialectical development, according to Ballard, is convergence toward
homogeneity in the structures of the events that compose development, it is hard to say whether in time men become more
mechanical or machines become more human. (Whether it means
to say that machines, expressions of human imagination as they
are, are essentially mechanical is never fully explained.) Since the
dialectic that characterizes man-machine interaction is also a feature of other human creations, language, art, even children, the
trick, not achieved in this collection, is to specify the peculiar
situation of machines in the partnership between human creativity and the always imperfect and incomplete state of human
knowledge. Ballard does offer an excellent argument against the
attribution of intentionality to machines. If a machine is described as aiming at a goal, he says, it means that it is geared to
reach a given coordination of its parts in time and space with
certain objects. But a coordination of its parts with indeflnitely
many objects exists at any moment, and there is no way to know
which of these object coordinations the machine was aiming at
especially. The goal is ascribed by the human observer.
Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. argues that communication with
machines is less creative than communication among people. His
chief example is playing chess with computers. This is not a good
example, however, since no one plays chess with a computer,
after all, but with a program written by other human beings. The
mediated structure of this event is not very different from reading
a book written by another human being in lieu of having a live
conversation. The conclusion that things are getting worse can
hardly be justified until differences in indirect human communication through the agency of a printed page and through the
agency of a computer program can be more tellingly differentiated. Johnstone argues that one of the most pernicious aspects of
new communications technology is its capacity "to put human
beings on hold." It is again unclear how the effects of new media
differ essentially from older print technologies, which, in permitting no immediate response, also put readers on hold. From a
different perspective, human beings are also placed on hold when
they cannot apprise themselves of matters of concern to them
that are going on or have gone on at some distant remove of
space or time. Media take users o^hold in these circumstances.

130

PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC

Using face-to-face dialogue as the simplest and purest case of
communication, Don Ihde offers preliminary observations for a
phenomenology of mediation. A medium, he says, is a material
artifact experientially used to convey expressive activity. Clothing
and makeup are certainly material artifacts that mediate faceto-face communication, but Ihde apparently means to restrict
himself to machinery-like artifacts, though he does not say precisely why. Media, he argues, distort the space-time character of
prototype or original communication. Our ancestors, practitioners of as thorough an oral tradition as the history of human
communication has to offer, used material artifacts (knives, cups,
spoons and other ritual memory objects) to recall people and
events from "time out of mind" and to tell stories about them, a
distortion of original space-time as great as any offered by television. If there are differences in the mediation of different media,
they have not been established here.
Having argued that whatever alters face-to-face communication
is bad, Ihde concludes that electronic media are worse than print
media because electronic media deceptively duplicate aspects of
face-to-face communication. It is a contradiction to assert both
that it is bad for media to distort in-person dialogue, but that it is
worse partially to restore some its elements. By Ihde's original
criterion for judging the value of mediated experience, print
ought to be worse than electronic media.
The last two essays are not philosophy, properly speaking. Sociologist John O'Neill, the other non-philosopher in the group
besides Editor Hyde, offers an impressionistic account of some
aspects of popular culture that is long on sensation, short on
analysis. He advises that an adequate theory of political subversion requires a model of political economy as a communicative
process, an idea that has been developed by others elsewhere.
Calvin Schrag's essay warns that a university should not be confused with its equipment. The mysterious process of education is
not technical in character, the expression of a will to control, but
a maieutic process of midwifery. This is an intelligent essay but
for a confusion that applies to the others as well: the assumption
that history used to be nice. Schrag presents the early university
as unpoliticized and unbureaucratic. As H. F. Kearney and other
historians have told us, the English university was politicized and
bureaucratic by at least the sixteenth century, a period far
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enough back to qualify as pre-technologically modern in the
sense argued in these essays.
On the whole, no systematic theory of communications or its
relationship to technology is advanced in this collection, except
for the idea that mediated communication is probably bad communication. Since all communication is mediated in some fashion, and since it is not true that this is a recent phenomenon, or
only recently a phenomenon of exaggerated dimension, it would
be helpful to see philosophers translating their unease with modern technology, particularly modern communications technology,
into analyses of greater dgor.
Carolyn Marvin
Annanberg School of Communication
University of Pennsylvania

